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2

Charles River Associates, Inc.
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Abstract— This paper demonstrates the utility of systems
and control theory in the analysis of economic systems. Two
applications demonstrate how the analysis of simple dynamic
models sheds light on important practical problems. The ﬁrst
problem considers the design of a retail laboratory, where the
small gain theorem enables the falsiﬁcation of pricing policies.
The second problem explores industrial organization using
the equilibria of proﬁt-maximizing dynamics to quantify the
percentage of a ﬁrm’s proﬁts due strictly to the cooperative
effects among its products. This ”Value of Cooperation”
suggests an important measure for both organizational and
antitrust applications.

we show that a game-theoretic measure on the value of
cooperation emerges naturally by studying how equilibria of
the market system change under different coalition models.
The point is made on a simple example.
In both of these cases, simple dynamic models facilitate
insight into the nature of economic behavior. Although
economics and control have an established history, it is
our view that economic systems continue to provide a rich
application domain for control theory to contribute to a truly
interdisciplinary area [4], [9].

I. I NTRODUCTION

II. D ESIGN OF A R ETAIL L ABORATORY

In today’s society, economic systems are among the most
heavily instrumented of any engineered system. Point-ofsale data-capturing mechanisms, such as scanners, are ubiquitous, and businesses invest heavily in data warehousing
and analysis technologies. With the advent of the internet,
it is not uncommon for ﬁrms to warehouse terabytes of
data. Various disciplines, such as statistics, data mining,
machine learning, and operations research have postured
to help managers transform this data into useful decisions.
In spite of these efforts, control theoretic approaches to the
problem still add unique value by emphasizing dynamic
behavior and the effects of feedback.
This paper demonstrates the point by exploring the
implications of simple dynamic models of economic phenomenon. Section II. highlights the ﬁrst example, discussing
recent work in the design of a live retail laboratory at
Brigham Young University. Retail is modeled as a feedback
process. Optimal control formulations of various pricing
mechanisms have recently gained renewed popularity in
the ﬁeld of Revenue Management [8], but little work has
studied the veriﬁcation of such mechanisms. Our work on
the design of a retial laboratory reveals the importance of
robust control formulations for yielding pricing strategies
capable of being conclusively invalidated.
Section III. develops an entirely different view of market
dynamics emphasizing the competitive interaction between
ﬁrms and their subsequent industrial organization. Here
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A. Retail as a Feedback Process
We begin our discussion with the idea of a ﬁrm. Our
ﬁrm will begin its life with a ﬁxed amount of capital,
C(0), (or credit available, but our assumption is that there
is a ﬁxed bound on the purchase power available to the
ﬁrm), and a list of n wholesale goods it can choose to
purchase. There may be many potential suppliers of these
goods, so the actual information the ﬁrm receives is a matrix
of wholesale prices (effective costs) we denote as a p × n
matrix PW (k), where k = 0, 1, 2, ... is the number of days
since the ﬁrm began operation. Thus, PW (k) are the prices
the ﬁrm receives on the morning of day k, and we assume
they will not change until the next morning.
The ﬁrm purchases wholesale goods on day k at price
PW (k) by specifying a matrix XW (k), which identiﬁes
how many of the n goods from each of the p suppliers the
ﬁrm will purchase at the current price, PW (k). Of course,
the ﬁrm has limits
 on its spending characterized by the
constraint that
i,j xw(i,j) pw(i,j) ≤ C(k), where xw(i,j)
and pw(i,j) are the (i, j)th elements of XW (k) and PW (k),
respectively.
The ﬁrm then makes offers to its retail market for a price
of its choosing. Since the ﬁrm may offer different effective
prices to its m customers (or different store locations, or
other type of channel), say through coupons or special
offers, etc., the pricing decision of the ﬁrm is represented
by a m × n matrix PR (k), which means the prices available
to the m retail customers (or channels, or segments) of the
n goods on the morning of day k. Note that goods that the
ﬁrm has not purchased wholesale are listed as available for
very high prices.
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equivalent modes of communicating offers to the ﬁrm’s
customers. Likewise, all modes of communication with a
ﬁrm’s suppliers are considered equivalent. Although this
may not be precise for real economic systems, it is a
reasonable simpliﬁcation for the purposes of our analysis.
Furthermore, note that usual classiﬁcations of the ﬁrm
as a price-setter or price-taker, or of the market as being
competitive, oligopolistic, or monopolistic are unnecessary
here. The ﬁrm makes its procurement and pricing decisions
with the best information it has at any particular time, and
information about whether it is operating in a competitive
environment or has some special market power will be
reﬂected in how the market responds.

Retail
Market
XR

PR
Firm

PW

XW
Wholesale
Market

Fig. 1.

A retail ﬁrm interacts with wholesale and retail markets.

Wholesale
Market

B. Validation of a Learned System
(PW , XR )

Retail
Market
XR
PW

With this view of the feedback process, where all market
inﬂuences and disturbances have been lumped together into
one operator M : U → Y, we want to explore fundamental
limits on validating a learning process. We may suppose
that M has a state space realization of the form

Market

PR
Firm

XW

Firm

x(k + 1) = f (x(k), u(k), k)
y(k) = g(x(k), u(k), k)

(PR , XW )

Fig. 2. By rearranging Figure 1 (left), we note that the distinction between
a retail and wholesale market simply imposes structure on the more general
feedback relationship (right).

The retail market then responds with purchases throughout day k characterized by a matrix XR (k). This m × n
matrix describes how much of each of the n goods each
of the m retail customers or segments purchased that
day. At this point, money from the day’s transactions are
collected, and the next
 capital becomes
 morning’s available
C(k+1) = C(k)− i,j xw(i,j) pw(i,j) + i,j xR(i,j) pR(i,j) .
Although real prices are quantized by the fundamental
monetary unit, and the unavailability of a good may be
considered ontologically different than associating a very
high price with the good, we will ignore these details
for simplicity and consider that PW (k) ∈ Rp×n and
PR (k) ∈ Rm×n . We thus deﬁne the ﬁrm as an operator
F : (Rm×n × Rp×n ) → (Rm×n × Rp×n ), its wholesale
market as an operator MW : Rp×n → Rp×n , and its
retail market as an operator MR : Rm×n → Rm×n , which
yields the picture shown in Figure 1. More generally, we
could consider cases where the wholesale and retail markets
are interrelated, yielding a combined market operator M :
(Rm×n × Rp×n ) → (Rm×n × Rp×n ). This results in a very
general feedback structure as shown in Figure 2, where
C is an internal state of the ﬁrm. We assume that such
interconnection is well-posed, in that solutions of the system
u and y exist and are unique.
Notice that in this view of retail, a ﬁrm’s interaction
with the market is to buy and sell. Coupons, markdowns,
special promotions, advertising, etc. are all modeled as

x(0) = xo

(1)

where u is a vector of size p × n × m × n (the number
of distinct decisions the ﬁrm can make at time k), x is
a presumably very large vector of internal market states
(that we, nevertheless, assume to be ﬁnite), and y a vector
of market observations (same length as u). We assume
that the ﬁrm has no special information about its market,
and thus only knows [u(k), y(k)] over a ﬁnite duration
k = 0, 1, 2, ..., t. In particular, the ﬁrm does not observe
the internal market states x, nor does it have complete
information of f or g.
Once in operation, however, an intelligent ﬁrm will begin
to consider its observations [u(k), y(k)] , k = 0, 1, ..., t and
use them to develop some understanding of how its market
behaves. It may accomplish this by hiring experts who retain
some partial information of the market dynamics f and g, or
by employing novel learning processes that analyze its data
in effective ways. However the ﬁrm operates, though, it will,
explicitly or implicitly, develop a model, or theory, of how
the market behaves and attempt to use this understanding
to its advantage.
Assuming that the ﬁrm has explicitly developed a model
of its market, consider the model as an operator T : V ⊂
U → Y. That is, the understanding a ﬁrm obtains about
its market enables it to establish expectations about what it
will observe for at least some of the actions it might take
(u ∈ V). Regardless of how the ﬁrm developed its particular
model T , however, it will need to determine how well the
model approximates the true market before it will have the
conﬁdence to widely use the model to develop pricing or
other policies. Restricting the market to the situations where
the model applies, one approach the ﬁrm could take would
be to measure some notion of distance between M and T .
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Ideally, one would measure this error using the gain, or
induced norm, of an operator, given as
|Eu|
u=0 |u|

E = sup

M

M
(2)

where | · | indicates an appropriate signal norm, and E =
M − T is the prediction error. In practice, however, this
quantity is difﬁcult to compute. The ﬁrst challenge arises
from the fact that each signal u or y is a time function
of inﬁnite duration. Next, a search over all possible inputs
u ∈ V to ﬁnd the supremum is impractical, especially when
most ﬁrms typically have market response data for only a
few different pricing functions (e.g. often only the ”normal”
price followed by a sale price).
Finally, even if these other challenges could be resolved,
just measuring the prediction error for a single, particular
pricing function for even a limited duration is a difﬁcult
task. Although we may know how many widgets actually
sold for three months in response to a particular, even
a constant price, it is difﬁcult to generate a comparable
response from a market model because it is unclear how to
set the model’s initial conditions. If the market is assumed
to be asymptotically stable, then the effects of an incorrect choice of initial conditions eventually would become
negligible. Nevertheless, it would be unclear how long one
should wait for this to occur. Moreover, the assumption of
market stability in the ﬁrst place seems questionable in an
application domain bent on unbounded growth, ever-present
competition, and ubiquitous ”business cycles”.
These difﬁculties cause various modes of approximate
validation heuristics to be used in practice. The most
sophisticated of these use cross validation techniques to
attempt to approximate a measure of the modeling error.
Ultimately, this approach of trying to validate a learned
system by measuring the model error is attractive in that
the process can be conducted entirely from cached data.
As a result, the data warehousing industry has emerged,
offering ﬁrms the chance to store terabytes of data to drive
both learning and the subsequent validation processes.
Nevertheless, the link between these practical heuristics
and real validation is not ﬁrmly established. An alternate
validation process addresses the above difﬁculties, but at
the cost of demanding more involvement from the ﬁrm in
the scientiﬁc process than merely caching its data.
C. The Retail Laboratory and the Small Gain Theorem
Instead of trying to measure a comprehensive error of a
market model, another approach to validation focuses on
whether the proposed model is sufﬁcient for an intended
purpose. This approach uses a given model to design
feedback policies that accomplish a speciﬁed objective.
The effects of these policies on the true market are then
compared with the results expected from the model, and
the small gain theorem is employed to falsify models that
are insufﬁcient for the stated objective.

R

z

y

w

u
y

u

T

F
F
Fig. 3. The operator M can be factored as the feedback interconnection
of R and T .

z

w

R

R
z

T
y

u

w

G

F
G
Fig. 4. Regrouping operators, the small gain theorem guarantees that F
stabilizes M provided GR < 1.

In particular, the true market M can be factored into the
feedback interconnection of a theory of the market T with
the unknown remainder R. This feedback factorization often
allows an unstable operator M to be decomposed into the
feedback interconnection of two stable operators R and T .
Thus, although the conditions of the small gain theorem
require that the unknown part of the market, R, be stable,
this is a weaker condition than demanding that the market
itself, M , be stable.
The novelty of the approach arises when we consider
actually implementing a speciﬁc policy F that translates
observations from the market, y into speciﬁc actions u.
Although F may be designed only with information of
T , the small gain theorem says it will stabilize the real
market M provided RG < 1, where G is the feedback
interconnection of F and T . Note that we expect G to be
stable since we design F such that it stabilizes T .
Thus, the scientist can test the quality of a given market
theory T by designing a policy F that robustly and asymptotically stabilizes it with a desired rate of convergence.
Analysis or simulation of this ”ideal” closed-loop system,
G, then indicates how long it will take the feedback
interconnection of F on any system M ”close” to T (in the
sense that R is small enough) to stabilize. This suggests
a ﬁnite duration experiment that can be tested empirically
by implementing the policy F ”live” on the true market M .
Observing the closed-loop results over the required duration
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either results in success, meaning the closed-loop market
is behaving as designed (at least so far), or failure, which
implies that the conditions of the theorem were not met and
T is not close to M in that R ≥ 1/G. A model can thus
be conclusively invalidated, provided that a mechanism for
implementing a closed-loop policy ”live” on the true market
exists. This is the value of a true economic laboratory,
where experiments can be conducted and observed, even
without perfect control over the internal variables or outside
inﬂuences of the market.
III. I NDUSTRIAL O RGANIZATION
A. Proﬁt Maximizing Dynamics
Now, consider a market, M, of N products. Without loss
of generality, give these products an arbitrary order and
integer label so that M = {1, 2, ..., n}. Let p ∈ RN be the
vector of (non-negative) prices for these N products, and
let q : RN → RN be the (non-negative) demand for these
products at prices p.
We now consider a ﬁrm, F to be a subset of the N
products in the market, F ∈ 2M . This implies that the
ﬁrm controls the production and distribution of the products
assigned to it. Most importantly for our analysis, since we
consider a Bertrand market model, this implies that the ﬁrm
may set the prices of the n = |F | products assigned to it.
We suppose that the products of the market are partitioned between m ﬁrms. This
 implies that no two ﬁrms
control the same product, Fi Fj = ∅ ∀i = j, and that
the union of all products
m assigned to the m ﬁrms compose
the entire market, i=1 Fi = M.
Let cj (qj ), j = 1, ..., N be the cost of production of qj
units of product j. The proﬁt of the ith ﬁrm then is given
by

πi =
[qj (p)pj − cj (qj (p))]
j∈Fi

A proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm under the Bertrand model of
market behavior will tend to change its prices to maximize
its short-term proﬁt [7]. We model this behavior by assuming that the ﬁrm will evolve the prices of its products in
the direction of maximally improving its proﬁts. That is,
if product j belongs to ﬁrm i, then we expect the ﬁrm to
evolve the price of product j as

∂πi (p) 
dpj (t)
=
dt
∂pj p(t)
where p(t) is the pricing vector for the entire market at time
t.
Notice that these dynamics suggest that if the partial
derivative of proﬁts is negative with respect to the price of
product j, that the ﬁrm should decrease the price of product
j. This is in the direction of improving proﬁts. Likewise, if
the partial derivative were positive, the ﬁrm would increase
the price of product j to improve proﬁts. When the partial
derivative is zero, the motivation is to hold the price at this
locally proﬁt-maximizing position.

Reordering the N market products so that each ﬁrm’s
products are grouped together, and letting ni be the number
of products controlled by ﬁrm i, we then can partition the
pricing vector into components associated with each ﬁrm. If
every ﬁrm in the market is assumed to be proﬁt maximizing,
this yields the following market dynamics:
⎤
⎤ ⎡
⎡
ṗ1 (t)
(∂π1 /∂p1 )(p(t))
..
..
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
.
.
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
ṗn1 (t)
(∂π1 /∂pn1 )(p(t))
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
ṗn1 +1 (t)
(∂π2 /∂pn1 +1 )(p(t))
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
..
..
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥
⎢
.
.
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎢ ṗn1 +n2 (t) ⎥ = ⎢
(∂π2 /∂pn1 +n2 )(p(t))
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
..
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
..
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
.
.
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎢ (∂πm /∂p m−1
⎢ ṗ m−1
(t)
)(p(t))
n
+1
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
i
i=1 ni +1
i=1
⎥
⎥ ⎢
⎢
.
.
..
⎦
⎦ ⎣
⎣
..
ṗ N (t)

(∂πm /∂pN )(p(t))

(3)
where the dot notation ṗ(t) is used to represent dp(t)/dt.
Notice that if the market system (3) has an equilibrium,
such a pricing vector peq would represent prices from which
no ﬁrm can improve its proﬁts by unilaterally changing the
prices over which it has control. Under certain technical
conditions such an equilibrium can be shown to exist.
Moreover, this equilibrium can often be shown to be asymptotically stable, in the sense that any pricing vector p(0) will
converge to the equilibrium peq as t → ∞.
B. The Firm as a Coalition
Under the assumption that the market dynamics are
stabilizing, we expect price perturbations to re-equilibrate.
In this context, it is convenient to simplify the problem
by only considering the proﬁts of the ﬁrms at equilibrium.
These proﬁts deﬁne a payoff function reminiscent of those
used to deﬁne coalition games.
Let v(Fi ) = πi |p=peq be the payoff or proﬁt of ﬁrm i at
the market equilibrium prices peq . In this way the ﬁrm may
be thought of as a coalition of ni players in an N -player
cooperative game. Each player is a one-product company
that completely manages the production, distribution, and
pricing decisions for its product. The ﬁrm, then, is a
confederacy of these one-product companies that works
together to maximize their combined proﬁts or payoffs.
The theory of coalition games studies the behavior of
such coalitions once the payoff function is deﬁned for
every possible coalition [1], [5]. The idea is that any given
coalition Fi yields a well-deﬁned payoff v(Fi ), and then
a number of questions can be explored regarding how to
distribute the payoff among the members of the coalition,
etc.
Our situation is different because the payoff to a given
ﬁrm doesn’t just depend on the products it controls, but
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also on the market structure of the products outside the
ﬁrm. For example, consider a 10-product market and a three
product ﬁrm in the market. The payoff to the ﬁrm does not
just depend on the prices of the three products it controls,
but also on the prices of the other seven products. The
proﬁt-maximizing equilibrium prices of these other seven
products, however, may be set differently depending on
whether they belong to a single ﬁrm or whether they are
controlled by seven different companies. Thus, the payoff
to the three-product ﬁrm depends on the entire market
structure.
Coalition game theory addresses such situations by considering partition systems and restricted games. For our
purposes, it is sufﬁcient to partition the N products of M
into m ﬁrms and then assume that this structure is ﬁxed
outside of the particular ﬁrm that we are studying. This
enables us to work with a well deﬁned payoff function
induced by the proﬁt-maximizing dynamics of ﬁrms within
the market without eliminating the multiple-coalition (i.e.
multiple ﬁrm) cases of interest.
C. Value of Cooperation
To quantify the value of organizing a group of oneproduct companies into a single ﬁrm, we need to compare
the proﬁts the ﬁrm receives if it sets its prices as if each
of its products were independent companies with those it
realizes by fully capitalizing on cooperation between the
products. More precisely, let peq be the proﬁt-maximizing
equilibrium prices for the given market structure. In contrast, consider the new proﬁt maximizing equilibrium prices
achieved without cooperation if Fi were divided into its
constituent one-product companies and each independently
optimized their prices. Let this second set of equilibrium
prices serve as a basis for comparison, or reference, and
be denoted pref . The relative value of cooperation (VC)
of a given ﬁrm Fi in market M with structure S =
F1 , F2 , ..., Fm is then given by
RVCref (Fi , S) =

πi |peq − πi |pref
πi |peq

computes the expected normalized worth of the game i.e.
the per-capita
potential, P/N , equals the average per-capita
worth (1/m) i (πi )/(|Fi |). Given a market structure, this
measure characterizes the expected proﬁt of an averagesized ﬁrm (where size is measured with respect to the
number of products the ﬁrm controls) in the market, even
if such a ﬁrm does not actually exist.
Moreover, the potential has been connected to another
measure, called the Shapley value, Φj , which yields the
marginal contribution of each product in the market [6].
This measure characterizes how the payoff of a coalition
should be divided between members of the team. In both
cases, the potential and Shapley value do not suggest
anything about the intrinsic beneﬁt of forming coalitions
in the ﬁrst place.
The Relative Value of Cooperation, RVC, on the other
hand, captures the natural signiﬁcance for organizing production into multi-product ﬁrms. Nevertheless, this measure
does not yield any information about how the proﬁt of
a ﬁrm should be efﬁciently invested into each of the
ﬁrm’s constituent production lines. Thus, this measure is
inherently different from the potential or shapely value since
these focus more on the value of a member of a coalition to
the group, rather than the value of the coalition as a whole.
D. Example
To illustrate the point, consider a two product economy
with linear demand given by
q1 (t)
q2 (t)

−3.5
−3

−1
−2

p1 (t)
p2 (t)

+

100
100

(5)

Suppose that the unit production cost of each product is
c1 = 10, c2 = 10. If we consider a market structure where
each product is produced by an independent company, the
proﬁt function for each company becomes
π1 (t)

(4)

This measure is interpreted as the percentage of proﬁts
due to cooperation within the organization. It is bounded
between zero and one, and it facilitates direct comparison
between ﬁrms of different sizes.
Sometimes we may be interested in measuring the value
of cooperation between structures other than the current
market structure and the reference structure. This could be
the case when considering mergers between ﬁrms, or when
management is considering selling off a piece of the ﬁrm.
In such cases it is easy to extend the deﬁnitions of RVC by
simply replacing the equilibrium and reference prices with
the equilibrated proﬁt-maximizing prices of the two market
structures being compared.
It is instructive to contrast the RVC with other measures
used to characterize cooperative games. Hart and MasColell [3] deﬁned a measure, called the potential, P , that

=

π2 (t)

= q1 (t) (p1 (t) − c1 )
= −3.5p21 − p1 p2 + 135p1 + 10p2 − 1000
= q2 (t) (p2 (t) − c2 )
= −2p22 − 3p1 p2 + 30p1 + 120p2 − 1000

(6)
(7)

Taking the partial derivatives of each proﬁt function with
respect to the appropriate pricing variable, we ﬁnd the
proﬁt-maximizing market dynamics to be:


dp1 (t)
−7 −1
p1 (t)
135
dt
=
+
(8)
dp2 (t)
−3 −4
120
p2 (t)
dt

Figure 5 shows how the two-ﬁrm dynamics drive an
initial pricing vector to a proﬁt-maximizing equilibrium.
This equilibrium price is
pref =

16.8
17.4

.

and the associated equilibrated proﬁts are π1 = 161.84,
π2 = 109.52.
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and the associated equilibrated proﬁts are πeq = 316.667.
The relative value of cooperation in this example thus
becomes
RV C = 0.1431
This suggests that in this market, just under 15% of the
proﬁts of the two-product ﬁrm are due to cooperation.
IV. C ONCLUSION
This paper explored two applications of dynamic analysis
in economic systems. The ﬁrst considered a ﬁrm to be
an operator in feedback with its associated market. The
ﬁrm is characterized by its pricing policy mapping sales
data into prices. We discussed problems associated with
the veriﬁcation of such policies, and showed how robustness
results from the small gain theorem suggest that a true retail
laboratory could be feasible.
Fig. 5. Two ﬁrm price trajectory and proﬁt function
The second problem quantiﬁed measures to calibrate the
value of cooperation within a speciﬁc ﬁrm in a given market.
The idea is to assume proﬁt-maximizing dynamics among
Now, consider a market structure where both products are the ﬁrms within the market and compare equilibrium proﬁts
controlled by the a same ﬁrm. In this case, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in two different scenarios. The ﬁrst scenario considers the
function becomes
ﬁrm as it is, as a single economic entity with a uniﬁed
π(t) = q1 (t) (p1 (t) − c1 ) + q2 (t) (p2 (t) − c2 ) ,
objective and exhibiting full cooperation between its various
= −3.5p21 + 165p1 − 4p1 p2 + 130p2 − 2p22 − 2000. economic units. The second scenario considers splitting
(9) the ﬁrm into its constituent economic units and computing
With this market structure, the ﬁrm adjusts the prices of market equilibrium prices if these units maximized their
both products to optimize the same objective. These new individual proﬁts. Normalizing the difference between the
dynamics become:
cooperative proﬁts of the ﬁrst scenario and the aggregate


proﬁts of the independent units of the second scenario deﬁne
dp1 (t)
−7 −4
p1 (t)
165
dt
=
+
. (10) a measure we call the Relative Value of Cooperation, RVC,
dp2 (t)
−4 −4
130
p2 (t)
dt
of the ﬁrm in its current market environment. This measure
reveals the percentage of proﬁts derived from cooperation
within the ﬁrm. Quantifying the value of cooperation is a
ﬁrst step in understanding how ﬁrms exert market power in
their respective environments. This information is important
for both managers, who hope to leverage the information to
better lead their organizations, and regulators, who monitor
the impact of corporate decisions on social welfare [2].
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